

ART, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERNATIONALISM, 1945–73

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This guest-edited issue of *ARTMargins* evaluates the relationship between art, artists, and international institutions in the postwar period. Concentrating on the emergence of new forms of internationalism in response to decolonization and the diplomatic impasses of the Cold War in the decades following World War II, the issue confronts the problem of the nation-state within the emerging scholarly field known as “global modernism.” We propose that the term *global modernism*, while a productive shorthand for scholarship that expands modernism’s geographies, may also be anachronistic and misleading. The word *global* itself began to gain currency only after the 1960s, and particularly the 1970s, vis-à-vis the rise of transnational capitalism and global economic, environmental, and technological governance. Relying on a narrative of the “global before globalization,” uncritical use of this term erases the importance of forms of exchange that aren’t congruous with globalization as an economic process. Furthermore, global modernism risks becoming a would-be panacea to art history’s disciplinary discomfort with the continued impact of nationalism on both art and the growing art world in the latter half of the 20th century. In art and politics, what is meant by *global* versus *international* or is entailed by *internationalism* versus *globalization* has been subject to constant flux. These changing stakes open rich complications that risk being lost in a term such as global modernism.

Rather than look backward from the perspective of the global contemporary to define the global modern, we hope to recalibrate the stakes of the field by proposing internationalism as the primary lens to interpret the worldwide development and transmission of modern art made after 1945. This issue has its origins in the Art, Institutions, and Internationalism conference organized at the Graduate Center, CUNY, and the Museum of Modern Art in March 2017, and it represents a collaborative effort to find out what happens when global modernism is replaced with the intersection of art and institutions in the political context of postwar internationalism.

The stakes have shifted vastly, from its origins in 18th-century law to various modern arguments for internationalism as a free-trade, socialist, and diplomatic ideal. British philosopher Jeremy Bentham first coined the word *international* in the last chapter of *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1790), remarking in an 1823 reprint that it had since “taken root in the language.” In this and other writings, he argued that international (as opposed to internal) jurisprudence provided models for law *between* nations and national rulers, which could prevent wars, encourage free trade, reduce the need for national militaries, end colonialism, and ultimately establish a common “tribunal of peace.”¹ Long before Bentham’s coinage, however, nascent forms of “international law” had reinforced Europe’s colonial interventions around the world. In the 16th century, Spanish theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria envisaged a system of international justice governed by the concept of *jus gentium* or “law of nations.”² Vitoria argued for a shift of judicial authority from the divine mission of the Pope toward secular sovereigns and natural law applying to all peoples, including the indigenous peoples of South America. Far from guaranteeing protection from colonialism, Vitoria’s claim provided a justification for Spain’s appropriation of foreign lands

1 Bentham uses the example of a financial claim made earlier in the century by a group of London merchants against King Philip of Spain. Adjudicated in the English court of King James I, the case represented an example of *internal* jurisprudence. Had the dispute been between King James and King Philip directly, Bentham stated, it would have been a case of *international* jurisprudence. Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (New York: Hafner, 1948), 326–27. See also M. W. Janis, “Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of ‘International Law,’” *American Journal of International Law* 78, no. 2 (1984): 405–18; and Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin, 2013), 19–21.

2 In Latin, *gens* refers to a nation as a distinct group defined by extended familial bonds.

and violent treatment of the inhabitants based on their following (or not) the laws of *jus gentium*.³

Along with international law, colonialism created new international systems of consumption, exchange, and insurance that undergirded the slave trade and the transfer of goods between colonies and colonizers, as well as extending European models of the nation-state around the world during the 18th and 19th centuries.⁴ Institutions of internationalism also became a means to prevent European wars, most notably in the Concert of Europe, founded in 1815 in the wake of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Internationalist institutions increasingly “codified” (another Bentham coinage) communication and public life across nations (for example, the International Telegraph Union was founded in 1865, and the International Statistical Institute in 1885), and by the mid-19th century had also come to represent a free-trade ideal that opposed economic protectionism.⁵

In response to this shift, Karl Marx proposed an alternative definition of internationalism during the 1860s as a model of socialist organization that would unite the working classes around the world and overturn free market capitalism.⁶ As nation-states transformed rapidly to accede to the economic and political demands of the rising bourgeoisie, Marx and Friedrich Engels declared in *The Communist Manifesto* that under the conditions of capitalism “the working men have no country.”⁷ In 1864, the International Workingmen’s Association was founded in London, followed by the Second International in 1889.⁸ Despite their misgivings about the nation-state as a bourgeois institution, on the question of national independence for subjugated

3 Antony Anghie, “Franciso de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law,” in *Laws of the Postcolonial*, ed. Eve Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 89–107. See also Walter D. Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism,” *Public Culture* 12, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 722; and Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).

4 See, for example, Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 40; and Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1918).

5 For example, the Universal Postal Union in 1874 and the International Statistical Institute in 1885, which standardized units of measurement. See Mazower, *Governing the World*, 101–2.

6 Mazower, *Governing the World*, 55–64.

7 Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), 28.

8 See Mazower, *Governing the World*, 19–23, 38–48, 55–60.

and colonized peoples, the International embraced the expansion of the nation-state as a unit of political organization, as is evident in the ratification at the London International Conference in 1896 of a resolution for “the full right of all nations to self-determination.”⁹

In 1919, this model of national self-determination was put into practice, albeit imperfectly, by the Third International (Comintern). Meanwhile, internationalism as a form of bureaucratized peacekeeping returned to the fore when the League of Nations was founded in 1920. Reviving the Concert of Europe model of international diplomacy, the League included Japan, China, Siam (Thailand), and Persia (Iran). The strong presence of South American nations among the League’s founding members—fifteen in all—testified to the importance of decades of Pan-American multilateralism in the continent and a hope that internationalist institutions could forestall colonial interventions from the U.S.¹⁰ Despite this hope, the League remained firmly entrenched in Europe and generally supportive of colonialism. The League of Nations’ enduring legacy of colonialism inspired the formation of the League against Imperialism in 1927, a Communist-affiliated platform for anti-colonial internationalism.¹¹ By then the League of Nations was reaching a breaking point, however. In 1933, Japan quit the organization following a motion of censure for its invasion of Manchuria, and it was followed later that year by Germany under the newly elected National Socialist government.

In the post–World War II period, internationalism as a model of bureaucratized diplomacy reached its high point. By the end of the war and the founding of the United Nations in 1945, sixty-nine sovereign states were in existence. By 1975 there were 150, raising the UN’s membership from forty-seven in its founding year to 142 member states

9 Marxist support for the right of nations to self-determination was further developed in Vladimir Lenin’s essay of that name in 1914. While Lenin described the formation of the modern nation-state as a condition of capitalism, he also argued that when socialists (such as his interlocutor Rosa Luxemburg) failed to support national independence movements, it revealed “their echoing of the prejudices acquired from the bourgeoisie of the ‘dominant nation.’” Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” trans. Bernard Isaacs and Joe Fineberg, in *Collected Works*, vol. 20 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972). Reproduced at the Marxists’ Internet Archive, n.p., <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/>.

10 Mazower, *Governing the World*, 9, 122–23; Alan McPherson and Yannick Wehrli, *Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015).

11 Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World*, reprint edition (New York: New Press, 2008), 16–30; Mazower, *Governing the World*, 162–64.

thirty years later.¹² Newly independent nations saw UN membership as a mark of legitimacy, and the new members likewise helped validate the UN's mission. Postwar internationalism thus played a vital role in determining statehood and depended, in turn, on an increasingly normative model of the nation-state itself.¹³ In this context, institutions operating on behalf of nation-states and international diplomacy—arts councils, embassies, biennial pavilions, and organizations such as the British Council and the Rockefeller Foundation—became increasingly powerful. At the first conference of UNESCO's International Association of Plastic Arts, held in Venice in 1952, for example, cultural and artistic “delegates” from around the world debated, among other issues, increasing levels of state patronage for the arts and the role of international institutions such as UNESCO in managing that patronage. As American playwright and rapporteur Thornton Wilder wrote in a glowing report on the event: “Is it not a gratifying aspect of this conference that we feel that if an authority is international in character, its judgment in matters of art tends to inspire a greater confidence?”¹⁴

As Western Europe sought to maintain its cultural hegemony through international institutions such as UNESCO, headquartered in Paris, and as the United States and the Soviet Union deployed art as a “weapon of the Cold War” through both official and unofficial channels, new and newly independent nation-states also harnessed institutions of international cultural diplomacy and solidarity in the postwar period.¹⁵ In 1955, the year of the Bandung Conference, which led to the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement, and of the first Documenta, in postwar Germany, the first Ljubljana Biennial of Graphic Arts and the first Biennale de la Méditerranée were founded in the context

¹² Connie McNeely, *Constructing the Nation-State: International Organization and Prescriptive Action* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 42.

¹³ McNeely, *Constructing the Nation-State*, 37–72.

¹⁴ Thornton Wilder, “Final Reports: General Report,” in *The Artist in Modern Society: Essays and Statements Collected by UNESCO* (UNESCO, 1952), 123–24. The conference was originally planned to be held in New York, but Cold War tensions and the communist allegiances of some invited delegates took it instead to Venice. Following a second conference, held in October 1954, also in Venice, editor Alfred Frankfurter of the American magazine *Art News* complained in an editorial that despite his internationalist sympathies, the proceedings were in constant danger of being overwhelmed by an “Italo-French” bloc. See Christopher E. M. Pearson, *Designing UNESCO: Art, Architecture and International Politics at Mid-Century*, 1st ed. (Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2010), 56, 66n.

¹⁵ Eva Cockcroft, “Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of the Cold War,” *Artforum* 12, no. 10 (June 1974): 39–41; Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, reprint edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

of Cold War and regionalist international ambitions—following, of course, the Bienal Internacional de São Paulo, which had been founded in 1951.¹⁶

1989 has become a standard temporal marker for when the world—and the art world—supposedly became “global.” That year the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the apparent triumph of the first world over the second, and of neoliberalism over socialism and economic protectionism. The synchronization of multiple, international art worlds into an all-encompassing global contemporary has been commonly pegged to three major exhibitions, also held in 1989: *The Other Story: Afro-Asian Artists in Post-War Britain*, held at the Hayward Gallery in London; *Magiciens de la Terre*, at the Pompidou Centre and the Grande Halle de la Villette in Paris; and the Third Havana Biennial.¹⁷ Yet viewed through the lens of internationalism, rather than globalization with its attendant logic of neoliberalism, gentrification, and cultural tourism, the Third Havana Biennial, in particular, is better understood as a swansong of postwar international solidarity and third-worldism than as a “global” biennial. As Anthony Gardner and Charles Green argue, the project was “less . . . an origin so much as the *culmination* of an extraordinary if often overlooked history of biennial exhibitions.”¹⁸ Indeed, throughout the 1990s the words international and internationalism held on as the primary descriptors of the art world’s increasing diversity, as in, for example, the Mary Jane Jacobs-led Expanding Internationalism conference at the 1990 Venice Biennale.¹⁹ Well into the 1990s, scholars such as Olu

¹⁶ Anthony Gardner and Charles Green, “Biennials of the South on the Edges of the Global,” *Third Text* 27, no. 4 (July 1, 2013): 442–55.

¹⁷ See, for example, *The Global Contemporary: Art Worlds after 1989*, an exhibition at the ZKM Museum of Contemporary Art, Karlsruhe, 2011–12, which cites the Pompidou exhibition in particular.

¹⁸ Anthony Gardner and Charles Green, “South as Method? Biennials Past and Present,” in *Making Biennials in Contemporary Times: Essays from the World*, Biennial Forum no. 2 (São Paulo: Biennial Foundation, Fundação Bienal de São Paulo, and Instituto de Cultura Contemporânea, 2014), 28–36. See also Charles Esche’s introduction to Afterall’s volume on the Havana Biennial, which incorrectly names the project as only the fourth “international two-yearly contemporary art event on the planet,” and focuses on the “global” nature of the biennial. Rachel Weiss et al., *Making Art Global (Part 1): The Third Havana Biennial 1989*, *Exhibition Histories Vol. 2* (London: Afterall Books, 2012). See also Lucy Steeds et al., *Making Art Global (Part 2): “Magiciens de la Terre” 1989* (London: Afterall Books, 2013).

¹⁹ Partly sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, *Expanding Internationalism: A Conference on International Exhibitions* brought together attendees from 29 countries and included keynotes by Homi Bhabha and Guy Brett.

Oguibe and the London-based institution InIVA deployed the term New Internationalism rather than globalization to describe an increasingly interconnected art world.²⁰

In the years since, globalization has overtaken internationalism as the dominant model of economic, cultural, and political connectivity, enabling the rapid expansion of the global contemporary art world and, in turn, the development of “global modernism” as a scholarly field. Curatorial projects grappling with these shifts have been especially guilty of mapping a retroactive logic of contemporary global connectivity back onto the modernist period, however, which has occluded both the impact of internationalism on modern art and the nation-state as a site of friction.²¹ This issue of *ARTMargins* seeks to provide a corrective, by focusing on the problem of the nation-state and internationalism as the guiding geopolitical framework of the postwar period. The contributions to this issue thus focus on art, internationalism, and institutions between 1945 and 1973—from the end of World War II and the founding of the UN in 1945, to the year of the Chilean coup d'état, the OPEC crisis, and the Fourth Non-Aligned Conference, when militarism and nuclearization began to visibly erode the organization's founding principles of mutual nonaggression and third world socialism.

The two articles included in this special issue move beyond familiar art historiographical splits of this period—namely, abstraction versus realism and modernism versus “tradition”—by deploying internationalism as a framework of art historical analysis. In “Envisioning the Third World: Modern Art and Diplomacy in Maoist China,” Yang

20 Olu Oguibe, “New Internationalism,” *Nka Journal of Contemporary African Art* 1994, no. 1 (May 1, 1994): 25. Originally known as the Institute of New International Visual Arts, the organization later dropped the *New*, and over subsequent years it provided a hub for debates on the increasingly “global” art world and for the curatorial team behind Okwui Enwezor’s landmark *Documenta 11* in 2002. See Lotte Philipsen, *Globalizing Contemporary Art: The Art World’s New Internationalism* (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 2010), 10.

21 In a recent special issue of *ARTMargins* (7.2), Luke Skrebowski raised the issue of this anachronism on exhibitions on global neo-avant-gardes, such as Other Primary Structures at the Jewish Museum in New York in 2014, The World Goes Pop at Tate Modern in 2015–16, and International Pop at the Walker Art Center in 2015. While the latter exhibitions contested their own use of the word *Pop* to signify a set of related but distinctive neo-avant-garde practices, they nevertheless assumed a logic of “translatability,” relying on a contemporary logic of global commensurability back-projected onto the modern period. Luke Skrebowski, “Untranslating the Neo-Avant-Gardes,” *ARTMargins* 7, no. 2 (June 2018): 13–14.

Wang evaluates the intersection of Chinese modern art and Maoist international diplomacy in the work of artists Shi Lu and Zhao Wangyun during the mid-1950s. Tracing the movement of both artists through India and Egypt in the context of the Sino-Soviet split and Chinese efforts to court nonaligned and third world nations in Africa and Asia through culture, Wang underscores how both artists developed a uniquely Chinese modernism that mobilized the “traditional” practice of ink painting as a response to their travels. Bypassing Western definitions of modernism as forward looking and formally experimental, and also bypassing Western metropolitan centers to engage with artists and cultures in the third world, these artists and their peers in the Chang'an School of Ink Painting solidified their commitment to indigenous heritage through their international experiences. As Wang notes, rather than label his art resolutely nationalistic, artist Shi Lu justified his practice in terms of its international coherence by stating that “art is unique in that the more ethnically specific it is, the more international it can become.” In a context in which the sole patron of the arts in China was the state, Shi Lu and Zhao Wangyun offer an example of a “concomitant” modernism tied both to the nation-state and to international engagements.

Nikolas Drosos’s article “Modernism and World Art, 1950–72” explores how Malraux-inspired discourse of universalism played out in the pairing of modernism and “world art” in large-scale international exhibitions, specifically the first Documenta in 1955 and two exhibitions organized as part of the Brussels World Exposition in 1958: 50 Ans d’Art Moderne and its unrealized partner exhibition, L’Homme et l’Art. Drosos argues that these projects reflect two contradictory art historical discourses: on the one hand, the triumph of universalist narratives in the mode of Malraux, and, on the other, the contextualization of modern art as a distinctly Western European phenomenon. Drosos contrasts this with the continued influence of realism, both in Western European exhibitions such as the Venice Biennale and on the other side of the Iron Curtain, where the Soviet Academy of the Arts attempted to form their own definition of universalism through the eight-volume *Universal History of Art*. By giving specificity to universalism by tracing its logic through particular exhibitions and expanding on the importance of realism to debates on modernism to the west of the Iron Curtain, Drosos unsettles the easy use of the term “global” to describe regions of modernism that

hitherto had been unevenly addressed, if not entirely ignored, by Western art historians and curators. Drosos articulates how the similarly catchall term “world art” relied doubly on a fiction of universalist inclusion and on troubling colonial legacies, revealing the ultimate incommensurability of modernism and world art as postwar discourses and complicating the synchronization of art histories of this period.

As this issue’s Document, one of three texts by Brazilian photographer José Oiticica Filho, originally published in consecutive issues of the magazine *Boletim Foto Cine* in 1951, has been translated for the first time by Luisa Valle. Titled “Setting the Record Straighter,” Oiticica Filho’s texts challenge, with an aim at placation, the cries of nepotism in Brazilian photography exhibitions. His essays demonstrate a simultaneous ambivalence toward institutions as hegemonic sites and an understanding of their importance, particularly to an emerging community of photographers keen to use exhibitions to elevate the status of their medium. Drawing on his background in mathematics and entomology—and anticipating the anthropological approaches to art’s institutionalization by scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu in the 1960s—Oiticica Filho’s texts deploy the modern science of statistics to tackle institutionalized rivalries within the Brazilian photography community. As Alise Tifentale writes in her introduction to the Document, also at stake in Oiticica Filho’s project is a desire to mend rivalries and create a national solidarity among Brazilian photographers, particularly under the umbrella of the Brazilian Federation of Photographic Art, founded in 1951—in which Oiticica Filho played a role, bringing his statistical methods of analysis to its affiliated organization, the International Federation of Photographic Art, founded the previous year.

The issue of aesthetic value and the marginalization of particular forms that Oiticica Filho confronts in terms of photography is also at issue in Rattanamol Singh Johal’s review article of the recent exhibition *Postwar: Art between the Pacific and the Atlantic, 1945–1965*, held at the Haus der Kunst, Munich, between October 2016 and March 2017. Johal’s review contrasts the liberal capaciousness of the exhibition with art history’s neglect (particularly in journals such as *October* and the *October*-edited textbook *Art since 1900*) or outright dismissal of non-Western art as too derivative, literal, or “political,” shown by the critical disgust that greeted Rasheed Araeen’s 1989 survey of non-White artists

in Britain, The Other Story.²² These affronts coming from the “centers” of canonical modernism have typically, Johal points out, been justified by the category of “quality.” Mobilizing aesthetic judgment for the cause of affinity rather than difference, Postwar placed formalist themes such as “Realism” and “Concrete Visions” in unconstrained dialogue with more socially oriented lenses on modernism around the world, including sections on “Nations Seeking Form” and the “Aftermath” of the atomic era, for example. As Johal argues, the decision to complicate the *October* story of modernism rather than omit it from the curatorial narrative of Postwar represented one of the main strengths of the show, reflecting its project to reject fictions of methodological and cultural incommensurability in art history.

As part of the Art, Institutions, and Internationalism conference, Postwar co-curator Katy Siegel gave a keynote lecture on the exhibition, followed by a conversation with Romy Golan, which can be accessed at ARTMargins Online.²³ Also included in this issue is an edited transcript of the plenary roundtable on “Legacies of Internationalism” that closed the first day of the conference. Moderated by art historian Claire Bishop, this wide-ranging discussion of how the study of internationalism plays out in the participants’ current research, as well as of the methodological issues that arise when writing modern art histories through institutions, included architecture historian Lucia Allais and art historians Chika Okeke-Agulu, Olga U. Herrera, and David Joselit, along with artist Naeem Mohaiemen. During the roundtable, Mohaiemen discussed his research into international solidarity movements such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the conditions under which those movements fail or implode under internal power struggles. These topics also provided the basis for Mohaiemen’s video work *Two Meetings and a Funeral* (2017), which set the stage for the Artist Project that Mohaiemen, in collaboration with writer and researcher Uroš Pajović, conceived for this issue. *Southward and Otherwise* considers the collapse of the Non-Aligned Movement in the early 1970s, through the interplay of text by Pajović on the role of the former Yugoslavia in establishing Non-Alignment and accompanying images and captions selected by Mohaiemen.

²² The exhibition was held at the Hayward Gallery in London. See, for example, Brian Sewell, “Pride or Prejudice?,” *The Sunday Times*, November 26, 1989, quoted in Rasheed Araeen, “The Other Immigrant: The Experiences and Achievements of Afro Asian Artists in the Metropolis,” *Third Text* 5, no. 15 (Summer 1991): 17–28.

²³ www.artmargins.com.

While the contributions to this issue acknowledge institutions as sites of hegemony—particularly those operating on behalf of the nation-state—they also mobilize these sites as anchors through which otherwise nebulous ideas and broad changes in art history can be evaluated. In their recent history of large-scale exhibitions around the world in the 20th century, Gardner and Green note that the study of exhibitions can provide a “counterweight” to artist-centered art history.²⁴ Scholars such as Susan E. Cahan, Nancy Jachec, and Joan Kee have used exhibition and institutional histories to expand art history and to frame antiracist and anticolonial movements worldwide.²⁵ As Andrea Giunta and George F. Flaherty have recently argued, the expansion of art historical work on Latin American modernism over recent decades has leaned heavily on archival and institutional research: “In the last twenty years, the history of Latin American art ceased to be a discipline of connoisseurship and reconstituted itself as a social science. The impact of cultural studies, interdisciplinary research, and the expansion of the field in the wake of the reestablishment of democracy in Latin America since the 1980s made this radical paradigm change possible.”²⁶

Exhibitions and institutional histories can compress complex networks of artistic and cultural exchange into discrete sites of art historical analysis and track precisely how artists have navigated and appropriated various institutionalized forms of power. At stake throughout these histories is a reconsideration of the fraught relationship between modernity, modernism, and nationalism. T. J. Clark argues that modernity points to a “social order which has turned from the worship of ancestors and past authorities to the pursuit of a projected future—of goods, pleasures, freedoms, forms of control over nature, or infinities of information.”²⁷ Modernism, on the other hand,

²⁴ Anthony Gardner and Charles Green, *Biennials, Triennials, and Documenta: The Exhibitions That Created Contemporary Art* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), 9.

²⁵ Susan E. Cahan, *Mounting Frustration: The Art Museum in the Age of Black Power* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016); Nancy Jachec, *Politics and Painting at the Venice Biennale: Italy and the Idea of Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Joan Kee, *Contemporary Korean Art: Tansaekhwa and the Urgency of Method* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013). Also notable is Sria Chatterjee, Boris Friedewald, and Tapati Guha-Thakurta, *The Bauhaus in Calcutta*, ed. Kathrin Rhomberg and Regina Bittner (Ostfildern, Germany: Hatje Cantz, 2013).

²⁶ Andrea Giunta and George F. Flaherty, “Latin American Art History: An Historiographic Turn,” *Art in Translation* 9, no. supi (2017): 125–26.

²⁷ T. J. Clark, *Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 7.

has been characterized as both an inherent product of and critique of modernity—whether in Clement Greenberg's famous formalist definition of modernism as a process of self-critique of the conditions of possibility of a given artistic medium, or Clark's less restrictive formulation of modernism as the historical emergence of “a distinctive patterning of mental and technical possibilities” arising from the conditions of modernity.²⁸ In both instances, nationalism—and its sometimes reactionary attendant notions of tradition, religious and ethnic identification, and homeland—is seen as anathema to both modernism and modernity writ large. Yet, for much of the world beyond Western Europe and North America, nationalism and nationhood offered the only viable route to freedom from Western colonial and neocolonial power. For artists working in these new nations, modernity and modernism, as well as nationalism and internationalism, operated hand in hand, and the art produced in these nations represented this tension accordingly. This special issue considers how individual artists, organizations, and even nations negotiated postwar geopolitical realignments through the exchange of art and ideas dependent on international institutional collaboration and highlights overlooked points of friction in the study of “global modernism” by challenging the assumptions of *globality* embedded in that term.

As this issue was heading to print, in March 2019, we learned of the passing of Okwui Enwezor (1963–2019). A transformative voice in the art world over the last quarter century, Enwezor was the rare curator who consistently succeeded at shifting the trajectory of art history through his ambitious and wide-ranging exhibitions that expanded the discipline's horizons and forged a more inclusive and truly global understanding of modern and contemporary art. Postwar, his last major exhibition, was a guiding example as we developed the Art, Institutions, and Internationalism conference and this publication, which we dedicate to his memory.